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A LOOK INTO VOLUNTARY NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (NGO)
CERTIFICATIONS ON LABOR CONDITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
NIKE, A CASE STUDY
Elvira Oviedo

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to address the increasing voluntary use of non-governmental
organization (NGO) certification programs by corporations to uphold some form of structural
labour standards in their overseas factories. The increasing use of voluntary NGO labour-based
certification programs is a direct result of the gaping holes and lack of enforcement left by the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the laws and
regulations of the lands that these unethical labour practices are taking place in. This paper deep
dives into a case study of Nike, Inc. who, due to mass media attention on the unethical labour
practices occurring in their overseas manufacturing factories, were forced to reevaluate and
incorporate into their business model a code of standards primarily centered on remedying the
labour practices that were costing them millions of dollars.
Nike exemplifies the new trend in the corporate world of using NGO labour-based
certifications while also highlighting the shortcomings that such certification programs struggle
with such as lack uniformity, lack of enforcement, and possible biased participation. A quick
overview of alternatives to NGOs shows that while such alternatives can offer some solution, these
alternatives also have their own pitfalls. The Alien Tort Claims Act is currently pending in the
United States Supreme Court awaiting a decision that could either move bounds for labour activists
or heighten the political and legal barriers labour activists often find themselves in front of.
Additionally, state laws are few and far in between. They offer no real enforcement and the
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors being implemented by some corporations are
not yet widespread enough to have any large effect. The lingering influence of past Secretary–
Generals of the United Nations who emphasized human labour practices and of the Human Rights
Council and the Global Compact Initiative are just that–lingering, and have opened a gateway for
participation of initiatives as proof of ethical labour practices when the reality is to the contrary.
While international agreements and organizations, national laws, and NGO labour-based
certifications all have weaknesses that vary in degree, the conclusion, with the support of Nike as
a case study, is that NGO labour-based certification programs do have merit and have the potential
to greatly change the corporate world’s operations into one that prioritizes ethical labour practices.
I. THE WTO AND ILO’S STANCES ON LABOUR STANDARDS
It is important to note that the WTO states almost no rules or regulations for labor
conditions regarding international trade and production.1 The only exception to the WTO’s
silence regarding labor conditions is in Article XX (General Exceptions) of the General

1

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 State. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter GATT].
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which states that products made by prison labor are a
general exception and are allowed in international trade and production.2
Besides this one exception allowing the use of prison labor in production practices, the
WTO is of the “clear consensus: all WTO member governments are committed to a narrower set
of internationally recognized ‘core’ standards—freedom of association, no forced labour, no
child labour, and no discrimination at work (including gender discrimination).”3 However, the
WTO has not implemented any explicit regulations or codes that would enforce these core
standards in making of products that are traded internationally or are outsourced for cheaper
production purposes.4 The WTO justifies their lack of action towards implementing any form of
regulatory practices through a number of reasons. Some nations are highly in favor of adding
labor standards into the WTO structure with the belief system that doing so would provide great
incentive to nations to improve labor standards and would help towards fostering universal
criteria for labor standards.5 However, many developing nations are in opposition to the WTO
adding in labor standards because of the fear that the more industrial nations would actually use
these labor standards to take advantage of and undermine the low wage trading partners that are
available in these developing nations.6 Developing nations also fear that they would not be able
to meet the criteria mandated by labor standards simply because they might not be able to afford
it.7 Imposing labor standards on developing nations could greatly undermine and impair the rise
of their economic development which would then possibly dismantle parts of the international
trade system.8 Developing nations also worry that the developed nations’ eagerness to add labor
standards to the WTO framework is really just a guise for protectionism instead of any real
concern for bettering labor conditions.9 The possible conflict between member nations that
initiating labor standards through the WTO could cause is the main motivation behind the
WTO’s unwillingness to form any real agreement regarding labor standards.
Instead, the WTO defers to the International Labor Organization (ILO) to negotiate labor
standards between nations.10 The WTO allows their secretariat to work with the secretariat of the
ILO to work together on policy making with the goal of meeting some form of universal
“coherence” in labor standards and to allow the WTO to indirectly have some say over decisions
that impact the global economy.11

2

See id. at 37-38.
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
Labour
Standards:
Consensus,
Coherence
and
Controversy,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey5_e.htm#:~:text=There%20is%20a%20clear%20consensus
,work%20(including%20gender%20discrimination) (last visited Sept. 30, 2020) [hereinafter WTO Labour Standards].
4
See id.
5
See id.
6
See id.
7
See id.
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
See id.
11
See id.
3
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The main mission of the ILO is to “promot[e] social justice and internationally
recognized human and labor rights…”12 The ILO was established in 1919 shortly after World
War I as part of the Treaty of Versailles with the intention that the ILO would operate under the
belief system that “universal and lasting peace can be accomplished only if it is based on social
justice.”13 In 1946, the ILO became the first special agency of the newly formed United Nations
and eventually came to be the agency in power that the WTO deferred to when it came to matters
of labor standards.14
The international labour standards set by the ILO are separated into two different forms;
the standards are either Conventions (sometimes called Protocols) or Recommendations. 15
Conventions are “legally binding international treaties that may be ratified by member states”
while Recommendations “serve as non-binding guidelines.”16 Conventions lay down the basic
principles that ratified countries are implementing, while Recommendations supplement the
Convention by providing more detailed guidelines on how ratifying countries can best implement
the new principles.17 Representatives of member governments, employers, and workers provide
input for, and then write, both Conventions and Recommendations.18 Once a standard has been
adopted, it is then up to the member government to submit to the appropriate authority within
twelve months for consideration for ratification.19 Once a member state “ratifies” a Convention,
that member state commits to fully applying said Convention into its national law and practice.20
By ratifying, the member state is also committing to sending regular reports on the application
process and results of the ratified Convention to ILO. 21 If the Convention is approved for
ratification, that member state is expected to fully implement it within one year from the date that
it was ratified.22
The ILO has identified eight Conventions the ILO considers highly important and which
covers the “fundamental principles and rights at work: freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of discrimination in
respect of employment and occupation.”23 Currently, the United States has only ratified two of the
eight Fundamental Conventions: the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) and

12

INT’L LABOUR ORG., Mission and impact of the ILO, https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/mission-andobjectives/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
13
INT’L LABOUR ORG., History of the ILO, https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/history/lang--en/index.htm (last
visited Sept. 30, 2020).
14
See id; see supra WTO Labour Standards.
15
INT’L LABOUR ORG., Conventions and Recommendations, https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-tointernational-labour-standards/conventions-and-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2020)
[hereinafter ILO Conventions and Recommendations]
16
Id.
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
See id.
22
See id.
23
Id.
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the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). 24 Additionally, the ILO has
designated four Conventions to be Governance Conventions which are deemed high priority in an
effort to encourage member states to ratify them because of their integral role in ensuring
efficiency of the international labour standard system. 25 The four Governance Conventions cover
areas such as employment policies, labour inspections, and agriculture-specific labour standards.26
Compared to their participation in ratifying the ILO Fundamental Conventions, the United States
has only ratified one (Tripartite Consultation – International Labour Standards) of the four
Governance Conventions.27 Although there is not as great of an emphasis on them to be ratified
by member states, the ILO also currently has 178 Technical Conventions available.28 Currently,
the United States has only ratified eleven of the 178 Technical Conventions.29 Of these eleven
Technical Conventions that have been ratified by the United States, two of them are not currently
in force.30
It is important to delve deeper into why the United States has yet to ratify Conventions that
as far as precedent and moralistic values goes to show, are Conventions that the U.S. is inherently
in favor of supporting. Yet the U.S. chooses not to do so, even in the case of some Conventions
which one would think would be easy to ratify in terms of logistics because many American
corporate companies that outsource manufacturing or have supply overseas already have companywide regulations set in place that match the ILO Fundamental Conventions.
For example, one of the two ILO Fundamental Conventions that the United States has
ratified is the Abolition of Forced Labour, which states that any state that ratifies it agrees to
“[undertake] to suppress and not to make use of any form of forced or compulsory labour” as a
means of “political coercion, as a means of labour discipline, as a method of mobilizing economic
development, as punishment for participating in strikes, or as a mean of racial, social, national, or
religion discrimination.” 31 However, the United States has not ratified the Forced Labour
Convention, in which ratified states would undertake “to suppress the use of forced or compulsory
labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period.”32 In fact, the United States is one of
only nine states out of 187 ILO members to have not yet ratified the Forced Labour Convention.

24

NORMLEX, Ratifications for United States of America, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102871 (last visited
Sept. 30, 2020) [hereinafter USA ILO Ratifications]
25
Conventions and Recommendations, see supra note 15.
26
Id.
27
Ratifications for United States of America, see supra note 24.
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
NORMLEX, C105 - Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:31225
0:NO (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
32
NORMLEX, C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:::NO:12100:P12100_ILO_CODE:C029:NO (last
visited Dec. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Forced Labour Convention].
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While the United States has not explicitly stated why they have not ratified the Forced Labour
Convention despite ratifying the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, one can take a few
guesses by looking at the language of the Forced Labour Convention.
Article II (2) of the Forced Labour Convention seeks to define what forced or compulsory
labour is by listing all the things that do not fall under the definition of forced or compulsory
labour.34 Specifically, Article II (2)(c) states that “any work…exacted…as a consequence of a
conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work…is carried out under the supervision and
control of a public authority and…not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals,
companies or associations.”35 In consolidation with Article XX of the WTO Agreement, Article II
(2)(c) is allowing for the use of prison labour for international trade and production.36 This is not
peculiar in itself but the devil is in the details and in the wording “not hired to or placed at the
disposal of private individuals, companies or associations.”37 The United States is infamous for its
mass incarceration and is the country with the highest private prison population.38 In 2016, the
United States had 8.5%, or 128,063, of its prison population of 1.5 million incarcerated in private
prisons.39 Even more drastic, 73%, or 26,249, of detained immigrants in the United States were
being detained in privately-run facilities.40 Being for-profit businesses, private prisons quite often
make their prisoners engage in labour if they are physically able to do so.41 Private prisons try to
avoid scandal and outcry by “paying” their workers, but this pay is dollars below the national
minimum wage standard with prisoners on average getting paid $0.14–$0.40 an hour. 42 When
accounting for currency differences, we will later see that this pay is not much different than the
amount Nike’s overseas workers were getting paid in their manufacturing factories. This calls into
question whether the United States has refused to ratify the Forced Labour Convention in
preference of the capitalistic pros that having a privatized prison system that partakes in
manufacturing and prison work brings.
Another example includes the United States refusing to ratify the Fundamental ILO
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, which is perplexing
in itself since the right to assemble is included in the First Amendment of the Unites States

33

See NORMLEX, C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) - Countries that have not ratified this
Convention, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11310:0::NO:11310:P11310_INSTRUMENT_ID:31217
4:NO (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
34
Forced Labour Convention, see supra note 32.
35
Id.
36
Id.; see WTO Labour Standards.
37
Forced Labour Convention, supra note 32.
38
See Vinay Basti and Kara Gotsch, Capitalizing on Mass Incarceration: U.S. Growth in Private Prisons, THE
SENTENCING PROJECT (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/capitalizing-on-mass-incarceration-us-growth-in-private-prisons/.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See id.
42
See id.
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Constitution.43 However, the First Amendment would not apply to non-U.S. citizens on foreign
territory, so a plausible explanation is that United States is willing to prevent people not on U.S.
soil from assembling in a call for more ethical labour practices if it allows for the continuation of
capitalistic endeavors. Just as interesting is that the United States has also yet to ratify the
Fundamental ILO Minimum Age Convention that states that, depending on the type of work
involved, the minimum child work requirement will be fourteen or fifteen.44 This is not much
different from the United States, which sets the minimum age requirement at fourteen years old
under the Fair Labour Standards Act (FLSA).45 It seems almost hypocritical on the United States’
part to not ratify such a convention, especially when it is becoming increasingly commonplace for
American corporations to include the same, if not slightly higher at age sixteen, minimum age
requirements in their company policies. Regardless of the cause for the United States’ lack of
action towards ratifying the ILO conventions, the United States government looks complacent and
uncaring in the face of their corporations participating in unethical and poor working conditions
overseas.
The United States is a prime example of the shortcomings a country can have despite being
an active member state of the ILO and trying to ratify and implement Conventions. Implementation
of ratified Conventions are not fully enforced, as exemplified by the two Technical Conventions
that the United States has ratified but does not currently have in force.46 The lack of accountability
for full implementation of ratified Conventions calls into question whether the labour standards
set by the ILO are being met. There is also much suspicion regarding the Conventions that
countries choose not to ratify. News reporting and documentaries about sweatshops, child slavery,
and unhygienic conditions within outsourced factories owned by American companies further
solidifies the skepticism regarding ILO and the implementation of their labour standards.47
II. NGO CERTIFICATIONS
As big American companies sought to maximize their profits, they began outsourcing the
production of their products in factories in underdeveloped or developing countries. 48 There,
American companies were able to reduce manufacturing costs due to lower labour standards, less
organized labour unions, and lower employee wages.49 In response to criticism by the media and
advocacy groups, large American companies which engaged in practices that involved unethical
43

See NORMLEX, C087 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No.
87) - Countries that have not ratified this Convention, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (Jul. 04, 1950),
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11310:0::NO:11310:P11310_INSTRUMENT_ID:31223
2:NO.
44
See NORMLEX, C138 - Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138) - Countries that have not ratified this
Convention, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (Jun. 19, 1973),
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11310:0::NO:11310:P11310_INSTRUMENT_ID:31228
3:NO.
45
See U.S. Department of Labor, Age Requirements, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/youthlabor/agerequirements#:~:text=As%20a%20general%20rule%2C%20the,un
der%20the%20age%20of%2016.
46
See supra USA ILO Ratifications.
47
See Max Nisen, How Nike Solved Its Sweatshop Problem, BUSINESS INSIDER (May. 9, 2013, 10:00 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-nike-solved-its-sweatshop-problem-2013-5.
48
See id.
49
See id.
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labour standards were forced to dramatically change their labour practices abroad or risk further
boycott and negative scrutiny from the public.50
Companies moved towards making these changes by garnering certifications by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).51 NGOs exist on both a national and international level and
are a “voluntary group or institution with a social mission, which operates independently from
government.” 52 NGOs cover a broad assortment of topics such as healthcare, environmental
issues, women’s rights, foreign policy, and labour conditions. 53 NGOs aspire to develop and
implement programs and approaches that uphold the social and economic policies the NGO is
trying to achieve.54 NGO certifications provide a form of regulatory expectations for companies
who choose to conform to the requirements and specifications of the desired NGO certifications
they are seeking to obtain.55 In order to dissipate scrutiny or criticism from the media and the
public, companies will often alter their own corporate policies to meet the requirements that would
allow them to comply with the policies of the NGO certification they are hoping to obtain.56
Because the GATT/WTO intentionally does not mention labour conditions except for an
explicit exclusion allowing for use of prison labour and because corporations are voluntarily
exposing themselves to the certification programs offered by various NGOs, neither NGOs nor the
corporations who choose to participate in their programs are in violation of the GATT/WTO. The
only “persons” allowed to bring disputes before the WTO are WTO members, so even if
corporations fail to pass or continue compliance with the certifications and accreditations that
NGOs provide, there are no real legal consequences from the WTO for these corporations. In these
cases, the only consequences corporations would face was loss of certification and potentially bad
press from the media. However, bad press and sour public opinion can have lasting consequences
on corporations, especially on issues heavily pushed by a sense of morality and ethics.
A prime example of an NGO that provides labour standards certifications is the Fair Labor
Association.57 In response to several labour condition scandals that involved overseas child labour
and sweatshops within American apparel and footwear companies, President Bill Clinton put
together a national task force that consisted of both NGOs and multinational companies in an
attempt to resolve these issues.58 President Clinton challenged the task force to work together to
establish regulations and standards to improve labour conditions and the task force then shortly
evolved into the Fair Labor Association.59

50

See id.
See id.
52
FAQ: What is an NGO, NGO SOURCE, https://www.ngosource.org/what-is-an-ngo (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
53
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the United States,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.state.gov/non-governmental-organizations-ngos-in-theunited-states/.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
See History, FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION https://www.fairlabor.org/about-us/history.
58
See id.
59
See id.
51
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The Fair Labor Association has a Workplace Code of Conduct of “labor standards that aim
to achieve decent and humane working conditions” and which are “based on International Labor
Organization standards and internationally accepted good labor practices.” 60 Companies that
choose to affiliate themselves and mark themselves as having been approved, so to speak, by the
Fair Labor Association are “expected to comply with all relevant and applicable laws and
regulations of the country in which workers are employed and to implement the Workplace Code
in their applicable facilities.61” The Fair Labor Association Workplace Code of Conduct focuses
on elements such as regulating the amount of hours workers can work in a week, requiring that
minimum compensation be sufficient to meet the basic needs of the workers in the nation they are
employed in with some discretionary income, and that employers provide a safe and healthy work
environment with contingency plans in case harm or an accident befalls an employee.62 Other
elements also include child labor regulations, compliance with nondiscrimination practices, and a
recognition of the employees’ right to association and unionization.63 It is interesting to note that
while Article XX of the GATT explicitly allows the use of prison labor, the Fair Labor Association
Code of Conduct outwardly contradicts the GATT/WTO Agreement by stating that “there shall be
no use of forced labor, including prison labor, indentured labor, bonded labor or other forms of
forced labor.” 64 This is exemplary of how although the GATT/WTO Agreement lacks any
substantial form of labour standard regulations, NGO certifications can fill in the gaps.
However, NGO certifications themselves have come into scrutiny as they became
increasingly popular with companies in just a couple of decades.65 The scrutiny towards NGO’s
have been persistent in topic and is rooted in the duplication of certification programs which leads
to wasted resources, poor coordination, a lack of professionalism, and the lack of power NGOs
actually have to enforce their certification regulations.66
The following case study dives deep into the unfair labour standards and conditions that
were behind the growing worldwide success of Nike, Inc in the 1970’s through the early 2000’s.
It follows the public outrage at the discovery that Nike was participating in overseas sweatshops
which unfairly treated their majority female and child workers and the steps Nike took with great
help from NGO programs and certifications to remedy these injustices in their labor practices and
in the eyes of the strict public scrutiny. The present status of Nike’s certification compliance with
labour-based NGO certifications is also reviewed as well as recent news releases that speak to the
contrary.

60

Code of Conduct, FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION, https://www.fairlabor.org/our-work/labor-standards (last visited Oct.
20, 2020).
61
Id.
62
See Workplace Code of Conduct, FAIR LABOR ASSOCIATION, https://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/flacode_of_conduct_.pdf
63
See id.
64
See id. See GATT, supra note 2.
65
See Charles-Antoine Hofmann, NGO certification: time to bite the bullet?, HUMANITARIAN PRACTICE NETWORK,
(Nov. 1999), https://odihpn.org/magazine/ngo-certification-time-to-bite-the-bullet/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
66
See id.
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III. NIKE, A CASE STUDY
Originally, most of the shoes and apparel that Nike was internationally known for were
manufactured in factories in Taiwan and South Korea.67 In these countries, Nike was able to pay
their workers low wages without much thought of labour standards regulation or minimum wage
paying laws. 68 However, as labour unions and organizations formed and spread in amount of
members in both Taiwan and North Korea, minimum employee wage prices began to be formed,
enforced, and increased. 69 As a result, Nike urged their overseas manufacturing contractors to
move to China, Indonesia, and Vietnam.70 Because of a lack of organized labour unions in China,
Indonesia, and Vietnam, Nike was able to pay the workers at factories mere cents an hour for their
labour.71
The amount of money that Nike was saving by not paying their factory workers fair or
living wages is widely regarded to be one of the main reasons why Nike’s popularity and revenue
steadily surged into the early 1990’s.72 With the money Nike was saving from minimizing their
manufacturing and overseas employee wages, Nike turned their business model into one that used
those saved costs for aggressive marketing campaigns which included highly visible and
widespread sponsorships with sports team, athletes, and celebrities.73 For example, Nike spent
$200 million sponsoring American basketball player, Michael Jordan, in return for him endorsing
and wearing the Nike brand during the 1992 Summer Olympics in Barcelona, Spain.74 However,
as Nike’s revenue continued to increase, journalists were becoming aware of the labour injustices
and inequality taking place in what they deemed to be Nike’s “sweatshops” and were working
towards publicly exposing Nike for their misdeeds.75
In 1991, labour rights activist Jeffrey Ballinger, who spent three and half years in Indonesia
working for a labour organization, published a report in which he was the first to report on the
shockingly low wages and poor working conditions inside one of Nike’s manufacturing factories
in Indonesia.76 Ballinger followed that report the following year by publishing an article, The New
Free-Trade Heel: Nike’s profits jumps off the backs of Asian workers, in Harper’s Magazine in
which he more heavily documented the lack of labour standards and unethical practices taking
place in Nike’s manufacturing factories in Indonesia. 77 In his article, Ballinger focused on

67

See Nisen, supra note 32.
See id.
69
See id.
70
See id.
71
See id.
72
See id.
73
See id.
74
See Jeffrey Ballinger, The New Free-Trade Heel: Nike’s profits jumps off the backs of Asian workers, HARPER’S
MAGAZINE 46-47, August 1992, http://archive.harpers.org/1992/08/pdf/HarpersMagazine-1992-080000971.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJXATU3VRJAAA66RA&Expires=1466354923&Signature=GuzAGJL99j
mQtdjxkHswI0WLZJA%3D.
75
See Nisen, supra note 32.
76
See id.; see Ballinger, supra note 59.
77
See Ballinger, supra note 59.
68
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instances of abuses the workers faced and specifically criticized the poor working conditions, child
labour, exceedingly low wages, and lack of labour organization within the factories.78
The Harper’s Magazine article also included a specific highlight from Ballinger on a
female Indonesian worker, Sadish, who was getting paid just fourteen cents an hour, which was
well below Indonesia’s minimum wage at the time.79 Sadish was working six days a week, each
day being a ten and a half hour workday and working about sixty three hours of overtime for her
paycheck to come out to $37.46.80 Every hour of overtime only added an additional 2 cents to
Sadish’s overtime time and although Sadish and many others took overtime work shifts primarily
out of economic necessity, the workers expressed that they were also being compelled to take extra
shifts by their employer.81 Ballinger highlighted Sadish in an attempt to exemplify how Nike’s low
wages were negatively effecting and exploiting foreign workers, with women being
disproportionately on the backhand of Nike’s lack of labor standards and unethical business
practices.82
Ballinger drew attention to the fact that while Nike had made $3 billion dollars in sales in
1991 alone, $200 million dollars of which went towards funding Michael Jordan’s sponsorship the
following year, Nike was complacent in paying their overseas workers abysmal wages in similarly
abysmal working conditions.83 By shifting their manufacturing factories to cheaper labor pools,
Nike was also shifting their business model to be an active participant in negatively furthering the
poor working conditions of workers in developing countries.
Nike’s initial response was to deny that they were at fault for the conditions the overseas
employees in question were working in.84 Nike’s director of compliance, Todd McKean, argued
that Nike was not directly at fault and stated “our initial attitude was, ‘Hey, we don’t own the
factories. We don’t control what goes on there.”85 With that mindset, Nike continued to assert that
they were not who should be blamed for the labor practices the owners who operated these factories
chose to partake in.86 However, Nike executives quickly realized that this rationalization didn’t
absolve Nike of fault in the media’s eyes and quickly moved to mitigate the negative media
attention they were receiving.87 Nike’s next response to the public outcry and criticism to the initial
report Ballinger published prior to his article in Harper’s Magazine was to create their own code
of conduct regarding labor conditions and practices. 88 Nike Code of Conduct was to be
implemented on a company-wide scale. 89 The Nike Code of Conduct was designed to lay out
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minimal standards Nike expected all their supplier factories and facilities to meet in order to show
Nike’s “commitment to the welfare of workers and to using resources responsibly and
efficiently.”90
The Nike Code of Conduct focused on voluntary employment, compensation and benefits
policies, minimum age requirements for employees that were minors, safe and clean working
environments, and sustainability practices. 91 Additionally, in complete contradiction to the
exception made by the GATT–WTO Agreement which allows for countries to utilize prison labor,
Nike explicitly stated in Nike Code of Conduct that employment is voluntary and that “the supplier
does not use forced labor, including prison labor, indentured labor, bonded labor or other forms of
forced labor.”92 Nike excluding prison labor from their own labor regulations goes to show how
companies themselves, often with the incentive to be in good standing with public opinion and in
compliance with labor based NGO certifications, can enact their own labor standards and policies
to be used internationally to fill in the gaping gaps that the GATT–WTO Agreement leaves open
for countries and international companies to exploit for their own economic benefit.
The Nike Code of Conduct was distributed to all of Nike’s factories and suppliers both on
domestic land and in foreign countries.93 Within five years of the Nike Code of Conduct being
established and implemented, Nike had conducted more than 600 audits in their factories to ensure
that factories were in compliance with the Nike Code of Conduct.94
Despite Nike’s efforts in enacting a labor based code of conduct, Jeffrey Ballinger’s expose
in Harper’s Magazine the following year highlighting the unethical labor practices in one of Nike’s
Indonesian factories proved that Nike and the Nike Code of Conduct had yet to fully resolve the
issues surrounding their “sweatshops” overseas.95 More heightened public criticism and disgust at
Nike and their low wages and poor labor conditions inside their sweatshops were immediate in the
wake of Ballinger’s expose.96 Protests erupted at the 1992 Summer Olympics where Nike was
undergoing a massive marketing campaign at and CBS quickly interviewed Indonesian factory
workers of the abuses they were experiencing in Nike’s factories which further confirmed what
Ballinger had been reporting.97
Nike’s next attempt at trying to clean up their tainted brand image was to create a
department whose sole purpose was to implement changes that would improve the working
conditions of their factory workers.98 However, Nike was still struggling to disassociate itself with
the image of barely paid workers making Nike athletic shoes in foreign sweatshops that the media
and their consumers had latched on to and refused to let go of. Groups at numerous university and
90
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colleges throughout the United States were teaming up with the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC)
to organize national hunger strikes in protest of their schools’ athletics departments and teams
being sponsored by Nike.99 University students called for the college and universities to end their
sponsorships with Nike. 100 Student activists at big reputation schools with well-known sports
teams such as Duke University, the University of Michigan, and the University of Wisconsin and
others staged sit-ins which garnered thousands of student participants.101
In some cases, this topic of unethical labour conditions became a stepping stone for the call
to ethical business practices in the United States. Students at the University of Oregon stormed the
entrances of the buildings that housed the school’s top administrators and staged a sit-in that
blocked entrance to the building.102 Signs with Nike’s signature logo read in bright, bold letter’s
“TAKE A HIKE, NIKE.”103 Tensions became especially high at the University of Oregon because
Phil Knight, the chairman of Nike, was an alum of the university and was also the school’s biggest
benefactor, with Knight providing funding for many of the school’s new buildings, renovations
for the football stadium, and for many of the school’s athletics programs.104 Knight was considered
to be the university’s most important benefactor, and because the University of Oregon was the
single biggest employer in Eugene, where the university was located, the town as a whole relied
heavily on the funding that Knight provided to the university.105 After the University of Oregon
refused to remove itself from being a part of the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), Knight
revoked his $30 million pledge to the university. 106 The Worker Rights Consortium was a
watchdog group that monitored the labour practices and conditions of factories.107 The WRC did
not allow corporations to participate in setting their terms for labour conditions and instead set
their own terms without corporate participation that corporations needed to be in compliance with
to obtain WRC certification.108 Nike was not aligned with WRC and was instead partnered with
the Fair Labor Association (FLA) which did allow to corporations to participate in setting their
terms for working conditions.109
Upon learning that women were disproportionately victim to Nike’s poor labour
conditions, feminist groups and coalitions joined in protest against Nike.110 The presence of these
feminist groups were further amplified when Nike started an advertising campaign in an attempt
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to promote their female athletic gear. 111 In retaliation, these feminist groups started their own
campaign with the slogan of “Just Don’t Do It,” a play on words on Nike’s infamous brand slogan
“Just Do It” in an attempt to encourage people to boycott buying Nike athletic shoes and gear.112
Student activism did prove to be effective at some schools. Students at St. John’s
University protested Nike’s sponsorship deal with the athletic department and consequently, Jim
Keady, an assistant soccer coach at the university, quit his job in protest over his contract
demanding he wear Nike’s athletic gear.113 Citing Nike’s poor working conditions as the cause
behind his actions, Keady stated “I don’t want to be a billboard for a company that would do these
things.”114
Nike once again attempted to fix their image by hiring civil rights activist Andrew Young
to examine Nike’s working condition in their overseas factories. 115 After inspecting numerous
factories manufacturing Nike products in Asia and Latin America, Young reported that found no
evidence of poor working conditions or of widespread mistreatment of any of the workers.116
Young admitted that although Nike needed to do more to safeguard the changes the Nike Code of
Conduct had implemented to ensure continued compliance, that he found “Nike to be in the
forefront of a global economy” and that the “[F]actories we visited that produce Nike goods were
clean, organized, adequately ventilated and well lit.” 117 Young’s only real criticism of the
company’s overseas factories was that actual supervisors hired and trained by Nike to ensure
quality control were noticeably absent from the factories and that the factories seemed to be largely
run by expatriates who struggled to speak the local language fluently.118
The report by Andrew Young did not have the effect Nike intended and quickly backfired
with many public outlets criticizing the report.119 Nike and Young were criticized for using Nike’s
own interpreters during the inspections, which questioned whether there was a positive bias
towards Nike in the answers Young was hearing and basing his report off.120 Nike was also accused
of trying to use Young and his report to deflect from increasing the pay of their overseas factory
workers and from having to implement any real, long-lasting ethical working standards. 121 In
response, Nike denied any claims of deflection and asserted that they only intended to use Young’s
report as “a level of oversight to its commitment to setting the standard for global workplace
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standards” and that Nike had every intention of fully implementing and taking into consideration
all of Young’s recommendations and criticisms.122
The actions of student activists, public officials, labour unions, and of customers in the face
of unethical labour conditions and standards brings into focus the power the individual and the
collective have as consumers. The public refused to allow Nike to not take accountability for their
poor labour conditions, and Nike suffered the consequences of their actions. In the face of losing
a large base of their consumer demographic, Nike was forced to reevaluate and reinvent the labour
practices and standards they participated in overseas. The negative outlook on consumers and
public opinion regarding Nike’s working conditions and practices was the catalyst or Nike
partnering up with nongovernmental organizations in an effort to come into compliance with a
higher and more ethical standard of corporate labour practices in foreign countries.
Due to weak demand for their products and unwavering criticism from the public regarding
their labour practices, Nike’s profits dramatically decreased, and they were forced to lay off
workers. By then, Phil Knight, the University of Oregon alum who withheld millions of donations
from the school for their refusal to separate themselves from the Worker Rights Consortium
(WRC), had become the new chief executive officer (CEO) of Nike and started his tenure with a
call for change in the way Nike operated its overseas factories and employees. 123 “The Nike
product has become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime, and arbitrary abuse,” stated
Knight in a speech following his new position as CEO of Nike. Knight then raised the minimum
wage of their factory workers and implemented changes to increase quality control in monitoring
to ensure that the Nike Code of Conduct regulations and standards were being enforced.124 In an
effort to make the factories a safer and more healthy workplace, Knight also announced that
overseas Nike factories would adopt the United States Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) standards for clean air in manufacturing factories.125
In collaboration with the World Bank and the International Youth Foundation, Nike helped
launch their own nongovernmental organization called Global Alliance for Workers and
Communities in 1999.126 Global Alliance was an effort by Nike to better their standing in the
public eye and to better the working conditions of factory workers in developing countries.127
Global Alliance operates under two primary objectives. The first objective is “to give voice to the
concerns and aspirations of factory workers, initially, those employed by the footwear and apparel
industry, mostly young women in their late teens and early twenties.”128 Global Alliance sought to
meet this objective by interviewing thousands of workers in Nike factories in Vietnam, Thailand,
and Indonesia about the conditions they were working in, what they sought improvements in their
workplace, and about career plans they had for the future and how Global Alliance could instill a
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workplace environment that helped them achieve their aspirations.129 The second objective is to
“design and deliver programmes that respond to the hopes and concerns expressed.”130 One of the
biggest concerns of the factory workers was their health, and as a result, the factories began to
offer training seminars on nutrition, women’s health, and basic health.131 Nike also started bringing
mobile clinics into their Thailand factories which focused on women’s health and screened the
female workers for cervical cancer, breast cancer, and sexually transmitted diseases.132 The clinics
helped women through their pregnancy and counseled them on various other health issues that
were common to women since their workforce consisted predominantly of women.133
Corporations that sought to be in compliance with Global mission were expected not only
to provide financial resources to Global Alliance in order to help Global Alliance accomplish their
mission statement, but were also expected to be fully transparent with Global Alliance about the
operations in their factories.134 Corporations were also expected to give Global Alliance full access
to their vendor factories so that Global Alliance could ensure they were in compliance with their
labour regulations and stay current on issues that still needed to be addressed in order to improve
the working and personal lives of their factory workers.135 In return, corporations would be able to
say that their labour standards were in collaboration with Global Alliance’s high standards of
labour conditions for foreign factories.136 The corporations would also have access to programs
and research targeted at improving the specific labour-related issues the corporation’s factories
were struggling.137
However, it is not in Global Alliance’s practice to consistently monitor to ensure that
participating companies are keeping up with labour practices that are up to par with their own code
of conducts.138 Such a practice calls into question how effective Nike’s partnership with Global
Alliance really is as there is no system in place to ensure regular and updated compliance with
ethical labour practices. Global Alliance has no definitive way of keeping Nike and other
corporations accountable in their promise to work towards bettering the lives of their factory
workers. Such issues furthered the groundwork for Nike to partner itself with other
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have voluntary certifications for labour practices and
working conditions, which corporations could get if they met the specific and high standards
required for compliance.
Nike is widely known to be in partnership with the Fair Labor Association (FLA), a
nongovernmental organization that seeks to create “lasting solutions to abusive labor practices by
offering tools and resources to companies, delivering training to factory workers and management,
conducting due diligence through independent assessments, and advocating for greater
accountability and transparency from companies, manufacturers, factories and others involved in
129
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global supply chains.” 139 However, the FLA has been publicly criticized for being “relatively
toothless” in the face of corporations because the FLA allows for active corporate participation in
the making of their labour standards.140 This creates an opportunity for corporations to help create
a labour standards certification program that leaves a lot of room for leniency in corporate
compliance, which could potentially cause scenarios where corporations get accredited with a
labour standards certification that lacks strict adherence to regulations and is not up to par with the
standards of other labour-related NGOs that disallow corporate participation. This was the decisive
reason for which, then chairman, CEO Phil Knight decided to pull a personal pledge to donate $30
million to the University of Oregon, his alma mater.141 The University of Oregon was affiliated
with the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), which did not allow for corporate participation in
creating the standards that the WRC based their certification programs on.142 Phil Knight was
trying to sway the University of Oregon from affiliating itself with the WRC and to move towards
a partnership with the FLA.143 This situation perfectly exemplifies how even NGOs cannot fix the
gaping hole in regards to labour practices in the WTO/GATT and how corporations like Nike can
still find weak spots in organizations formed to try and remedy these issues.
Besides the Fair Labor Association, Nike has also partnered up with several other labourrelated NGOs in an effort improve the working conditions in their factories. Specifically, Nike
partnered up with the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF),
which is a global union and whose aim is to “ensure protection of workers against all dangers
arising from their employment …; support national and international action arising in the struggle
against economic exploitation and political oppression of workers …; [and] secure genuine
equality for women employed in the sector to ensure their integration into trade union
organizations.”144 Nike is also in collaboration with the Social and Labor Convergence Program
(SLCP), which aims to establish and implement an industry-wide framework to assess social and
labour conditions.145 In order to gain certification from SCLP, Nike had to undergo a three-step
process which included data collection, verification, and data hosting and sharing.146 During the
verification process, experienced and accredited auditors travel to corporations’ foreign factories
and assess the labour and social conditions of the factories.147 Assessment includes doing thorough
walk-throughs of the factories, in-depth interviews with factory workers, and a combination of
self-assessment and joint-assessment of the factory by the corporations and auditors.148 From the
results, SCLP determines whether the corporation is adhering to the current standards of labour
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and social conditions in the industry and issues mandates for the areas where the individual factory
scored lowed or was severely lacking in.149
Many human and labour-rights activists acknowledged the efforts Nike was making to
better the lives of their foreign workers and to improve the working conditions of the factories.150
Nike became the first corporation in the apparel industry to reveal a complete list of factories they
contracted with which went to show the amount of increased transparency Nike had committed
to.151 This came after activists had spent years urging Nike to release a comprehensive list of all
the overseas factories that they subcontracted to in an effort to increase the amount of independent
monitoring done by NGOs, labour unions, and activists.152 Nike then went on to a publish their
own comprehensive report consisting of 108 pages in which they admitted their own shortcoming
and continued abuses that were still present in their factories, specifically those in Thailand, China,
Vietnam, and South Korea.153
However, the same human and labour rights activists stood firm in their belief that although
increased monitoring had dramatically improved the working conditions of Nike’s factories, that
Nike still had a multitude of severe issues they had to confront.154 These issues took place in the
form of hazardous materials that workers were frequently exposed to, unsafe air quality in the
workplace, and the eyebrow raising locking of factory doors during employment hours so that their
workers could not leave the factory. 155 Activists cited Nike’s own 108 page report which
highlighted that many workers in a quarter of factories were still experiencing both physical and
verbal abuse; that up to half of all factories engaged in restricting workers from having access to
the bathroom and drinking; and that half of the factories denied workers even one day off in a
seven-day work week.156 In a quarter of all factories, wages were still below the minimum wage
standard that Nike had committed to in their Nike Code of Conduct.157 The majority of workers
were still working over sixty hours a week and many of them were punished if they refused to
work overtime.158
While still working towards meeting the requirements needed to comply with various
labour-based NGOs, Nike was also making efforts at their annual corporate shareholder meetings
to talk about implementing more ethical labour and environmental practices in their factories.159
According to their 2001 Proxy Statement that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Nike had charged their Corporate Responsibility Committee with the task of being
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in charge of significant activities and policies regarding labor practices.160 The proxy statement
also revealed that Nike was using a portion of their funds for consulting services for labor
relations.161 Most significantly, was a shareholder proposal by a Class B shareholder who had set
up a framework of eleven principles which were designed to respect “human and labor rights of
workers” in China, one of the countries where Nike’s own reports showed that ethical labour
practices were still severely lacking.162 The principles were written as a joint effort between the
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Covenants on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, and Civil, and Political Rights.163 The proposal was signed and approved by
the Chinese government and China’s national laws. 164 In short, the eleven principles centered
around banning the manufacturing of goods through forced or prison labor; supplying fair and
decent working hours and wages that could realistically meet the needs of the worker; the
prohibition of child labour; and allowed for the freedom of association and unionization amongst
the factory workers.165 Principle three also explicitly prohibited the use of corporeal punishment
and prohibited any form of physical, verbal, or sexual abuse of the workers which was an issue
that Nike’s factories struggled with especially in Asian countries.166
Despite being epitome of everything that Nike was supposedly doing their hardest to
improve in their overseas factories, Nike’s Board of Directors voted against adoption of the U.S.
Business Principles for Human Rights of Workers in China. 167 The Board rationalized their
decision by asserting that their own Nike Code of Conduct already addressed most of the principles
contained in the Proposal and that some of the principles were too vague in nature to make
enforceable.168 The Board argued that as a corporation, they were already committed to following
the applicable laws of the countries their factories were located in and expected their
subcontractors to abide by these laws when manufacturing Nike products.169 The Board attempted
to further their argument with a reminder that Nike was the first in the industry to publish a code
of conduct establishing their own personal standards for labour practices and environmental
responsibility, and that the Nike Code of Conduct requirements for Nike factories often exceed the
local and national laws of the countries in which Nike’s factories were situated in.170
Although Nike’s arguments against approving the Proposal were true in essence, the Board
of Director’s reluctance to adopt even portions of the Proposal that were relatively reasonable and
ones which Nike supposedly already upheld gave rise to the question of how far Nike was willing
to bind itself to programs and agreements that would hold the company accountable to someone
else’s standards, not just their promises to engage in a higher standard of working conditions. Just
as questionable is Nike’s assurance that their contractors were committed to following the
160
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applicable local and national labor laws of the countries their factories were in. Some of the local
and national laws of the factories’ country of origin did not have strict labor laws or strict
enforcement policies. A lack of labour laws and weak enforcement of existing labour in these
developing countries were the reasons Nike originally moved their manufacturing to the factories
in these locations. Nike had purposely sought out areas in which they could get away with paying
factory workers extremely low wages in poor and unsafe working conditions. Thus, Nike’s
argument that they were committed to upholding the local and national labor laws of their
factories’ countries is a weak one because the labor laws of the developing countries Nike was
manufacturing in were not up to par with the western ideals of ethical labor practices or with the
standards the International Labour Organization (ILO) held itself to. While it was clear that Nike
was committed to improving the working conditions of their factory workers, their absolute
commitment could be called into question by critics who choose to see Nike’s Board of Directors’
recommendation against the Proposal as a limit to how far Nike is willing to go as a company to
ensure ethical labour conditions.
IV. NIKE’S PRESENT-DAY COMPLIANCE
Nike has been abundantly public in their constantly updated, continued efforts to improve
and better the working conditions of their factory workers.171 Nike has rebranded itself from the
company that was the face of unethical labor practices and sweatshops, into the figurehead of the
industry for ethical business and labor practices. 172 However, despite Nike’s new image and
efforts, the company has proven in recent years through multiple series of events that they are yet
still far from actually abstaining from labor practices that are unethical and exploit their workers.
Most recently, public outrage exists over Nike’s manufacturing factories in China.173 The
People’s Republic of China has been the subject of international criticism due to their treatment of
the Uyghurs, a minority ethnic group whom the majority of practicing Muslims.174 Led by the
Chinese Communist Party, the People’s Republic of China has taken to furthering their Communist
campaign by trying to assimilate the Uyghur people by placing restrictions on Uyghur’s cultural,
social, and religious life.175 In an effort to assimilate the Uyghur people, the Chinese government
detained hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs in mass detention camps which were aimed to “masseducate”.176 Many of the Uyghur people were then sent by the government to work in factories
that manufactured goods for more than eighty established global brands, Nike being one of
them.177 Familiar with facing harsh backlash for labour-related issues, Nike quickly issued a press
statement stating that at Nike “we respect human rights in our extended value chain, and always
strive to conduct business ethically and responsibly” and that Nike is “committed to upholding
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international labor standards globally.” 178 Also in their press statement, a Nike spokeswoman
insisted that Nike “strictly prohibited from using any type of prison, forced, bonded or indentured
labor.”179 Despite Nike’s assertions that their factories were not a part of the factories that the
Uyghur people were being sent to work at by their government as a means of assimilation, the
chief executive of the plant that owns and operates Nike’s manufacturing factories stated that about
600 Uyghurs were currently working in Nike’s factories.180 While the Republic of China maintains
that the labor of the Uyghur people that have been sent from their homes to work in factories far
from their native land is not forced labor because they are still getting paid, many international
labour organizations are still uneasy at what has been regarded as “highly disturbing coercive labor
practices that [were] consistent with the International Labour Organization’s definition of forced
labor.”181 The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) was not able to find conclusive evidence
that the labor by the Uyghurs is forced, but maintains that they do not believe the Uyghur people
are working in these Chinese factories on their own volition.182 The ASPI was able to find Chinese
government documents that “show that transferred workers are assigned minders and have limited
freedom of movement.” 183 The ASPI urged corporations such as Nike that were currently
operating factories which employed the Uyghur people to end their contracts with those factories
as they potentially find themselves in breach of trade laws which prohibit the importation of goods
using forced labor. 184 Corporations ending their contracts with manufacturing factories
participating in the “employment” of the Uyghur people could also work to encourage the Chinese
government from sending the Uyghur people to work in these factories as a means as “reeducation.”185
Nike’s reluctance to acknowledge that they could have been unknowing participants in
thinly disguised forced labor, a practice they explicitly state in their Nike Code of Conduct that
they prohibit in all their manufacturing factories and supply chains, brings further skepticism the
effectiveness and continuance of Nike’s own Code of Conduct and of the labour-related
certifications programs they are in compliance with.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO NGO CERTIFICATIONS
Although many corporations are relying on labour-based NGO compliance certifications
to keep the public at bay and to show that labour standards are a priority in their business models,
there still other avenues of labour justice available to not only corporations, but also as statutes
and acts written for the victims of poor labour conditions. Because these alternatives are not
widespread, are currently pending results, or have yet to show any long-lasting or large effect on
labor practices, only a brief walkthrough is needed in order to complete the overall picture.
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The first option is one which allows foreign individuals to bring civil suits against
American individuals under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in federal jurisdiction. 186 The
Alien Tort Claims Act is quite often used for suits against corporations for international human
rights violations and environmental crimes.187 Most recently, the Supreme Court has heard oral
hearings in the case of Nestlé USA, Inc. and Cargill, Inc. v. John Doe et al. which is a suit brought
by six former child slaves who were trafficked out of Mali and were victims of forced labour in
the cocoa fields of the Ivory Coast,.188 The cocoa fields the Malians worked are part of one of the
major suppliers for both Nestle USA and Cargill, Inc.189 Nestle and Cargill argue that while they
find human trafficking and child labor to be deplorable practices that deserved to be punished, the
suit the Malians bring is in the wrong forum and that applicable law does not apply to them because
they are corporations—not individuals.190 Nestle and Cargill’s attorneys also went so far as to
argue for immunity on behalf of the American corporations; with the stance that even if their
suppliers were found guilty of committing such crimes, the American companies should not be
held liable for ignorantly furthering the facilitation of human trafficking and forced child labor.191
While the Supreme Court has yet to declare judgment on this case, if they rule in favor of the
Malians, doing so would set a precedent that American corporations can be held liable for the
suppliers and manufacturing plants they use who violate human and labour rights. American
corporations would have to act with more diligence when going through normal ordinary business
operations and would not be able to plead ignorance in the face of a third party in their supply
chain violating labour and human rights.192 This would be a big win for labour activists as such a
ruling would allow for the law to more formidably back them up on claims against large
corporations who rarely face the consequences of the labour rights they violate overseas.
Second, is corporations who choose to continue the legacy that a past Secretary-General of
the United Nations instilled through the formation of the Human Rights Council and the Global
Compact Initiative which was started as an effort to promote corporate social responsibility.193
However, criticism lies behind this approach because decades later corporations are still engaging
in unethical labour practices without any real consequences and because it has created a gateway
for foreign trial cases to rely heavily on their participation in such initiatives as proof that they are
not in violation of labour rights.194
Some states have taken matters into their hands and have enacted statutes in hope of
instilling some form of corporate liability for American corporations who do not have ethical
working conditions. For example, the state of California has enacted the California Transparency
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in Supply Chains Act which requires “companies, including some companies headquartered
outside of California but doing business in California, to report on their websites the activities they
engage in to monitor their supply chains to prevent human trafficking and slavery.”195 Although
the companies covered under the Act are not required to participate in the anti-trafficking and antislavery activities, they are required to put out a mandatory disclosure on their website that they are
not in compliance with that part of the Act.196 The statute obviously lacks in any real action against
the corporations for violations, but it does effect consumer perspective who could boycott
companies not in compliance and that possibility could serve as encouragement to corporations to
come in full compliance with the Act as a preventive measure and avoid a Nike-like scandal.
Lastly, there is the rising integration of the environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
factors in corporations which seeks to implement itself in the decision-making process of
corporations by taking into consideration the environmental and social impacts corporate decisions
have.197 The rationale behind the ESG factors is that it is beneficial for both the corporate world
and society to make decisions which lead to more sustainable markets for the future.198 While the
ESG factors more heavily focus on environmental factors, an integration of ESG factors into the
corporate decision-making process still serves to better the labour conditions of many overseas
individuals since many employees are put into unsafe and unsanitary environments in the line of
work.
CONCLUSION
With so much discretion left from the WTO and the GATT due to their lack of setting an
international standard for labour regulations and working conditions, it was left to the International
Labour Organization, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international labour unions to
fill in the gaping hole. American states and federal acts also worked towards filling in the gap left
by the WTO and GATT, but as we have seen, these states have their weaknesses and still require
much work and change in order to truly fill in the goal to a respectable and effective measure. The
other alternatives to NGO certifications mentioned also leave much to be desired in terms of
effectiveness, enforceability, and in remedying their own personal weaknesses.
Nike is a prime example of how a corporation, when left to their own devices, will set in
place a business model that engages in unethical labour practices until a series of events happen
which jeopardize their profits. Nike was not a passive player in the low wages, physical and verbal
abuse, and poor and unsafe working conditions that took place in their overseas sweatshop. Nike
intentionally switched the locations of the factories they outsourced to minimize their
manufacturing costs as much as possible with little regard as to how their business model
negatively impacted their workers. It was not until Nike’s profits started dramatically decreasing
in the face of widespread public backlash that Nike chose to change their business practice to meet
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the more ethical labour practices and working conditions that consumers expected out of the brand
that they were wearing.
Nike’s strides towards raising the standards of their labour practices were largely helped
by various NGOs they partnered with. Although arguably weak in the face of any real
accountability, NGOs still instilled in Nike, and in many other corporations which faced similar
issues as Nike, a form of accountability and gave the public some level of certification that helped
ensure that the labour practices Nike was originally participating were being remedied.
However, as the very recent issue of the Uyghur people in China shows, NGOs are not the
end all, be all solution to the lack of international labour standards that we currently have. Even
combined with an aggressive corporate approach towards committing to upholding ethical and
high standards of labour practices and compliance with numerous national and international
labour-related nongovernmental organizations, Nike was still an operating character in an
international framework that allows for the exploitation and mistreatment of factory workers.
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